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ABSTRACT: This article focuses on methodological issues arising in a study of
character development, using illustrations of ‘sharing behaviours.’ Based
primarily in six early years settings in southeast England the research records
naturalistic observations of peer interactions for 55 children aged three to six
years. Applying grounded theory to the processes of observing, analysing and
interpreting evidence required a cautious and collectively reﬂective approach.
The methodology sought to moderate the inﬂuence of the researchers’ prior
knowledge of ‘grand theories’ of moral development and assumptions about
relevance to the observation records. The study’s originality lay in the
exploration of moral development without reference to any particular grand
theory as an explanatory framework; and in the reluctance to be drawn to
potentially simplistic rationalisations of the children’s intentions on the basis of
their observed behaviours. Exploring young children’s subjective experiences,
this research provides insights into the intricacy of this process, steering away
from ‘neat’ ﬁndings and attempting to reﬂect the sophistication of the children’s
skilful and sometimes surprising negotiations of moral dilemmas. Implications
for practice relate to the complexities involved in attempts to unravel the
developing moral characters of young children and the practice through which
this may be nurtured.
RÉSUMÉ: Cet article se centre sur des questions méthodologiques issues d’une
étude du développement du caractère, illustrée par le “ partage de comportements
“. L’étude s’appuie sur des observations naturelles d’interactions entre pairs (55
enfants âgés de 3 à 6 ans), principalement recueillies dans six services préscolaires
du sud-est anglais. Appliquer la grounded theory dans le processus d’observation,
analyser et interpréter des preuves a exigé une approche prudente et
collectivement réﬂéchie. La méthodologie a cherché à modérer l’inﬂuence des
connaissances antérieures, chez les chercheurs, des “grandes théories” du
développement moral et de ce qu’ils pensent de leur pertinence sur le recueil
d’observations. L’originalité de l’étude repose sur l’exploration du développement
moral sans prendre pour référence une grande théorie comme cadre explicatif; elle
repose aussi sur la réticence à la tentation d’une rationalisation simpliste
potentielle des intentions des enfants, à partir de l’observation de leurs
comportements. En explorant les expériences subjectives des jeunes enfants, cette
recherche fournit un apercu̧ de la complexité de ce processus et tente, en évitant
les résultats “propres”, de reﬂéter le rafﬁnement des talents des enfants et parfois
leurs étonnantes négociations des dilemmes moraux. Les implications pour la
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pratique reposent sur les complexités impliquées dans les tentatives de dégager le
développement du caractère moral des jeunes enfants et la pratique par laquelle il
peut être nourri.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit methodologischen
Fragen in einer Studie zur Persönlichkeitsentwicklung und illustriert diese am
Beispiel des Teilens. Vornehmlich auf sechs Vorschulsettings in Südwestengland
begründet, erfasst die Forschungsarbeit naturalistische Beobachtungen von
Interaktionen unter gleichaltrigen von 55 Kindern zwischen drei und sechs
Jahren. Die Anwendung des Ansatzes der gegenstandsverankerten
Theoriebildung (Grounded) beim Beobachten, Analysieren und Interpretieren der
Befunde erforderte eine vorsichtige und vertiefte Vorgehensweise. Durch die
Methodik sollte sowohl der Einﬂuss der Vorkenntnis bestehender Großtheorien
zur Moralentwicklung auf Seiten der Ausführenden minimiert werden, als auch
jegliche vermutete Relevanz für die Beobachtungsergebnisse. Somit bestand die
Originalität der Studie aus der Unabhängigkeit von bereits etablierten
Erklärungsmodellen bei der Untersuchung der Moralentwicklung; sowie dem
Widerstreben, sich zu möglicherweise vereinfachenden Rationalisierungen der
kindlichen Absichten auf Basis von Verhaltensbeobachtung verleiten zu lassen.
Durch die Erforschung der subjektiven Erfahrungen von Kindern, liefert dieser
Beitrag Einblicke in die Komplexität dieser Prozesse. Entgegen bisheriger ,,
makelloser” Befunde soll das kindliche Vermögen eines geschickten und
mitunter überraschenden Umgangs mit moralischen Dilemmata reﬂektiert
werden. Praktische Implikationen beziehen sich auf die Schwierigkeiten bei der
Erforschung der kindlichen Moralentwicklung, sowie auf das Vorgehen, diese zu
fördern.
RESUMEN: Este trabajo se centra en las cuestiones metodológicas surgidas en un
estudio del desarrollo del carácter, utilizando ilustraciones sobre el tema
“compartiendo comportamientos”. Está basado principalmente en la experiencia
de seis centros de atención a la infancia en el sureste de Inglaterra. La
investigación registró con observaciones naturalistas las interacciones entre
compañeros para 55 niños de entre 3 y 6 años. La aplicación de la teoría
fundamentada a los procesos de observación, análisis e interpretación de pruebas
requiere un enfoque colectivo prudente y reﬂexivo. La metodología buscó
moderar la inﬂuencia de los conocimientos previos de los investigadores de las
“teorías de base” sobre el desarrollo moral y las asunciones acerca de la
relevancia del registro de la observación. La originalidad del estudio reside en la
exploración del desarrollo moral sin referencia a ninguna teoría de base
particular como marco explicativo, y en la reluctancia a ser atraído por
potenciales racionalizaciones simplistas de las intenciones de los niños sobre la
base de los comportamientos observados. Para explorar las experiencias
subjetivas de los niños, esta investigación ayuda a comprender la complejidad de
este proceso, dirigiéndose lejos de las resultados “netos” y tratando de responder
a la complejidad de las negociaciones hábiles y a veces sorprendentes de los
niños sobre dilemas morales. Las implicaciones para la práctica de este trabajo
se reﬁeren a las complejidades implicadas en los intentos de desentrañar el
desarrollo del carácter moral de los niños pequeños y la práctica a través del cual
este proceso puede ser alimentado.
Keywords: Character; behaviour; naturalistic observation; sharing
Introduction
In the period 2006–2010 we conducted a major research project involving ﬁve separate
studies, mostly multi-method, looking at different aspects of character development in
different age groups in different populations. The results were to provide not so much
2 J. Arthur et al.
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pieces of a jigsaw as a range of disparate clues to what happens in character develop-
ment. Five research studies cannot provide a complete basis for an overall theory but
were designed to provide a range of solid evidence with which any overall theory
would have to be consistent. An overall account has been published on the project
website for each study separately (Learning for Life). The study reported in this
article was in many ways the most ambitious. Very young children were studied
mostly in preschool settings either in relatively deprived areas of London or in rela-
tively afﬂuent areas of rural Kent (Arthur, Powell, and Lin 2010).
Overall, our research was based on a number of working assumptions.
. Firstly, there is such a thing as character, an interlocked set of personal values and
virtues that normally guide conduct. Character is about who we are and who we
become and includes, amongst other things, the virtues of responsibility, honesty,
self-reliance, reliability, generosity, self-discipline, and a sense of identity and
purpose.
. Secondly, there is no ﬁxed set of values, easily measured or incapable of
modiﬁcation.
. Thirdly, choices about conduct are selections about ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ actions and
thoughts.
. Fourthly, character does not develop within a vacuum; in order to develop as a
person, an individual needs to grow up within a culture, and the richer the
culture, the more mature a person he or she has a chance of becoming (Arthur
2003, 3).
. Fifthly, education is concerned with active character development, not simply the
acquisition of academic and social skills.
. Lastly, at a conceptual level, it is important to distinguish between the qualities of
character that deﬁne virtue from other qualities of the self and/or person which we
are more inclined to associate with such notions as personality.
Clearly, when dealing with early childhood (three- to six-year-olds), some of the
assumptions of the research had to be treated with caution:
. An open mind has to be kept on whether the term ‘character’ has any useful
application to such young children. They do have personalities; but research
has to ask whether this can sensibly be partitioned in the way that applies to
adults.
. An open mind has to be kept on whether the notions of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ actions
aid or hamper an understanding of their behaviour.
. It must not be assumed that a ‘rich’ culture is necessary for developing a ‘mature’
character.
Whereas there is every possibility that the research might produce evidence to support
the Learning for Life assumptions, in the early years context they could not properly be
taken as starting points.
Research Ethics was a major focus in the design, avoiding coercion and being fair to
and respectful of parents and teachers as well as children. Detailed information was pro-
vided for all who returned completed consent forms. The identities of all participants
(practitioners, children and their parents) were protected through anonymised data
storage avoiding the use of data in a manner that might inadvertently identify
European Early Childhood Education Research Journal 3
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individuals. All participants retained the right to opt out of the project at any time. The
ﬁeld researcher sought the children’s permission to observe or talk with them on each
occasion. With the children, the researcher always tried to be alert to the range of cues
and signals that the children demonstrated, either to give ‘permission’ to be observed or
show displeasure or unwillingness to take part or continue. The ﬁeld researcher was
also sensitive and attentive to the ways of interacting with the young children and
their peer group. The study was designed with a view to the Revised Ethical Guidelines
of the British Educational Research Association (BERA 2004) and was approved by
our University Research Ethics Committee.
Exploring young children’s moral development
In this study of the foundations of moral character, the researchers were acutely aware
of existing theories concerned with young children’s moral development and reasoning.
Any investigation of the developing moral character of very young children has to be
seen as, to some extent, an exercise in relativism. The point was neither to see whether
children exhibited evidence for any particular theory of development nor to look for the
ﬁrst signs of adult values and moral thinking. Rather, the aim was to look at children’s
behaviour and to try to elicit their thinking in contexts where an adult might consider
moral considerations to be relevant. The research team leader had successful experience
in designing and conducting studies which elicited the subjective views of children in
their own terms (Hogan 2005). In this case, however, any success in avoiding the impo-
sition of adult perspectives arose as much from critical discussion within the team as
from the nature of the evidence collected. The study was designed as an exercise in
grounded theory. On the large scale, every effort was made to avoid favouring any par-
ticular theory of moral development or character. On the small scale, every effort was
made to ensure that conclusions reached were drawn from what was seen and heard at
the study sites and not from the presuppositions or predilections of any individual
researcher.
Readers are invited to consider, however, the major academic propositions about
young children’s moral and character development as the theoretical frame within
which the researchers sought to challenge their own and one another’s beliefs and gen-
erate grounded theory from the project’s data. Drawing attention to a cognitive perspec-
tive, Piaget (1947) emphasised the active nature of children’s brain development,
happening in an ordered sequence based on genetically determined stages. While the
stage proceeds, children gradually learn to cognitively construct and structurally
organize their thought and action. The successful cognitive development of one
stage leads to the occurrence of the next. Piaget also stressed that the acquisitions of
increasingly useful and more complex cognitive operations are achieved by children’s
interactions with their environment. He believed that social life among children is a
necessary context for the development of intelligence, morality and personality
(Piaget 1947; DeVries 1997).
Piaget (1932) described two types of morality: heteronomous morality and auton-
omous morality. Heteronomous morality is based on unilateral respect for and unques-
tioned obedience to authorities and the rules they prescribe. Autonomous morality is
based on mutual respect, reciprocity and equality among peers. Two types of morality
develop according to children’s social context. A constrained environment character-
ised by conformity to the dictates of a hierarchical authority may lead to the formation
of heteronomous morality. A cooperative environment characterised by mutuality and
4 J. Arthur et al.
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equality may result in the emergence of autonomous morality. It is crucial to note here
that Piaget was cautious about calling the two types of morality ‘stages’ (Snarey and
Samuelson 2008). There was no clear shift between the two types of morality in
terms of the satisfaction of cognitive developmental criteria for a stage theory, which
Kohlberg (1984) later on established in his work of moral development.
Kohlberg (1984) worked within a cognitive developmental paradigm and identiﬁed
six moral reasoning stages. He postulated that moral reasoning proceeds through an
invariant sequence of stages towards an increasingly adequate understanding of what
is just or fair. In the early years of life, young children begin with a primitive morality
guided by fear of punishment or desire for gain (pre-conventional stages). They initially
focus on the self and do not realize that the interests of others may differ from their own.
What is moral is understood by young children as respectful obedience to the authority.
Moral behaviour or action is justiﬁed by avoidance of penalties and the superior power
of authorities. When young children’s moral reasoning moves to the next level, they
start to recognise that other persons may have differing interests. What is moral
depends on the person’s immediate interests. The right action is that instrumentally
satisfying the self’s needs and occasionally others’ by a process of exchange.
These brief examples of inﬂuential theorists illustrate how cognitive developmental
theories, in particular the contributions by Piaget and Kohlberg, ascribe young chil-
dren’s moral development in ‘cognitive’ and ‘structural’ ways. Both have shaped the
ways in which scholars, psychologists, educators and even parents conceptualize
young children’s growth in their moral character. However, both claims have not
gone unchallenged. Among the critiques, the two most relevant to young children
are discussed here.
The ﬁrst is the idea of egocentrism. Piaget (1947) used it to describe young chil-
dren’s characteristic of preoperational thought. The term does not imply selﬁshness.
It simply emphasises that young children have not yet grasped particular concepts
including that there are other selves, with their own needs and feelings, their own
beliefs, and their own perspectives. The concept of viewing young children as ego-
centric has also been involved in Kohlberg’s early stage of moral development. In a
social situation, egocentrism may lead a young child to project her/his own feelings
and thoughts onto others. Sometimes, it can also form a unilateral view of rules and
power relations. A young child can accept and obey the rules of others without any
doubts. With an egocentric mind, young children may easily focus on the consequences
of actions rather than the intentions behind them. For example, the amount of punish-
ment for a wrongdoing, in a child’s egocentric mind, should correspond to the amount
of damage, regardless of any consideration of intention (Piaget 1932).
However, many investigators remain sceptical about young children’s egocentrism
(e.g. Harris and Kavanaugh 1993). In particular, some challenge the use of egocentrism
in young children’s understandings of the social world, which closely links with their
development of moral character. Unlike the idea of egocentrism, the studies in young
children’s ‘theory of mind’ suggest that even three- and four-year-olds are able to
understand why other people do the things and feel the things they feel. In general,
the term ‘theory of mind’ refers to the set of interrelated concepts and beliefs that we
employ whenever we try to make sense of our own behaviour or that of other individ-
uals (Premack and Woodruff 1978; Leslie 1992; Fodor 1992). Although studies have
also evidently found the limits of the young child’s theory of mind (Wimmer and
Perner 1983), the data showing that young children do have theories about the
minds, beliefs, and desires of other people is still strong (Gopnik 2010).
European Early Childhood Education Research Journal 5
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The implication of young children having a theory of mind is widening the scope of
studies in early years development of moral character. Young children are not hope-
lessly egocentric and merely the receivers of rules and regulations imposed by auth-
orities. Researchers have begun to study, for example, young children’s
understanding of intentionality and moral judgement (Leslie, Knobe, and Cohen
2006), friendship and moral awareness (Peterson and Siegal 2002), and cognitive
and social development (Rogoff 1990, 2003).
The second discussion is concerned with structural assumptions of the moral stages
particularly set forth by Kohlberg (1984). Although some studies support the validity of
these developmental stages (Colby and Kohlberg 1987; Dawson 2002), others have
also demonstrated that older adolescents and young adults appeared to regress from
stage four conventional moral reasoning to earlier pre-conventional stages (Holstein
1976). The problems lead researchers to look more deeply into the deﬁnition of mor-
ality, in particular the connections between reasoning about social conventions and
moral concepts about fairness and human welfare (Turiel 1977). Thus, alternative con-
ceptualizations of development in moral character were established, including Carole
Gilligan’s ‘Two Orientations’ – which suggested girls may reason differently from
boys (1982) and Domain Theory developed by Turiel and his colleagues (Turiel 1983).
Domain theory posits that social knowledge is constructed within three distinct
domains: moral, social conventional, and personal (Turiel 1983; Nucci 2001). The
moral domain includes issues of justice, human welfare, reciprocity, and individual
rights. The social conventional domain involves rules and regulations serving functions
of social systems and social organization. The personal domain is comprised of issues
that are not matters of right or wrong bur rather, issues of individual discretion, prefer-
ence, and personal choice. In contrast to Piaget’s (1932) and Kohlberg’s (1984)
assumptions that young children only abide by social norms and authority and do
not differentiate morality (fairness) from social convention until more advanced
stages, domain theory suggests even very young children reason differently about
moral actions that affect the welfare of others, and conventional matters imposed by
social norms or the dictates of authority (Turiel 1983; Nucci 2008). These three distinct
domains, therefore, provide research in young children’s moral character development
with an extended framework to work on.
Regarding moral issues, young children are concerned with the issues of harm to the
self and others (Nucci 2008). The examples in early childhood education would be
physical harm, e.g. pushing and hitting; psychological harm, e.g. teasing and name-
calling; and justice or fairness, e.g. snatching and destroying one’s toys (Hildebrandt
and Zan 2008). With respect to social conventional rules, the examples would be
issues like: table manners, e.g. waiting for others to ﬁnish their meals; classroom
rules, e.g. being quiet in the book corner; and modes of dress, e.g. skirts are for
girls. Regarding personal issues, young children might consider the matters for
instance, choices of friends, recreational activities, and other activities designed as
‘free choice’ (Nucci 2001). It is worth noting here that concepts of personal issues
are crucial in domain theory. Nucci (1996) suggested that the establishment of
control over the personal domain can satisfy the need to establish boundaries
between the self and others. It is then critical to establishment of personal autonomy,
individual identity, and a sense of moral agency. A sense of personal identity and
agency contributes to interpersonal relations in various social contexts, in which
actions such as those of reciprocity and cooperation occur (Turiel 2001).
6 J. Arthur et al.
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Proponents of domain theory suggest that other dimensions collectively contribute
to the formation of a child’s moral character; they argue that judgements in social con-
vention and the valuing of personal issues have a place together with justice reasoning.
From domain theory researchers’ points of views, caregivers and teachers should con-
sider how aspects of a caring environment and practices differentially map onto the
forms of social experience associated with the developments of young children’s
moral and conventional understandings. Another strand of theory relating to moral
development emphasises the importance of belonging and of reference groups (Nod-
dings 2008) or the opportunity to engage in social interaction with people seen as of
equal status (Horn, Daddis, and Killen 2008). It is quite possible that ostensibly
moral behaviour in young children is founded less upon compliance with authority
or with empathy than on the need to consolidate friendship groups.
Various inﬂuential theories point out different aspects in relation to young chil-
dren’s moral development and character formation. Cognitive developmental theories
emphasise the degree of cognition maturation and the abilities of moral reasoning
directing a child’s moral character development. To provide opportunities for young
children to practice and apply their moral reasoning skills is the key. The higher
levels of cognitive development indicate higher possibilities of becoming a moral
being. In contrast, Triune Ethics Theory (TET) (Gopnik et al. 1999) draws researchers’
attention to the sphere of emotion in the formation of a child’s moral character. The
early emotional experiences inﬂuence brain structure building a foundation for
further moral development. For young children’s moral character development, the
exploration of TET has two meanings. First, it seeks to explain individual differences
in moral functioning. Young children’s early emotional experiences can inﬂuence their
character formation and behaviour in context. The emotional experiences interrelate
with brain wiring and in turn affect information processing. The establishment of the
emotional circuitry relates to the brain’s architecture for morality as well as later
ethical expression (Narvaez 2007). Second, TET suggests ‘the initial conditions for
optimal human moral development’ (Narvaez 2008, 313).
Beyond the challenges concerning inherent features of the ‘grand’ cognitive devel-
opmental theories, there have also been debates about the epistemological positions and
paradigms that shape research on children’s development. Bruner, whose early work
from the 1940s was inﬂuenced by Piaget’s ideas about cognitive development, later
went on to assert that Piaget’s failure to consider intersubjectivity and the forms of
culture on which its operation depends represented a surprising gap in his theories;
but that Piaget’s ‘early work on moral development reveals a sensitivity to the
growing child’s reinterpretation of extant cultural norms, even if he [Piaget] shows
little interest in interpretation as a mental process in its own right’ (Bruner 1996, 8).
As a founder of the social constructivist movement, Bruner highlighted how Piaget’s
work differed signiﬁcantly in this respect from that of Lev Vygotsky (and indeed his
own later writings). For the latter, he said, ‘the most central question…is how a cul-
ture’s symbolic tools manage through social interaction to get from “outside” into
our “inside” repertory of thought.’ (Bruner 1996, 9). As the twentieth century pro-
gressed, there came a shift towards more contextually situated or ecological (Bronfen-
brenner 1979) explorations of children’s development as well as attempts to understand
the meanings they ascribed to their ‘real world’ experiences with increased attention to
children’s competence and agency. Haste (1998) has also ascribed these different
stances to liberal rationalist versus communitarian ontological positions and suggests
European Early Childhood Education Research Journal 7
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that the two viewpoints present very different implications and potential models for
moral development and education.
Perhaps in response to burgeoning social constructionist and postmodern perspec-
tives in academia as well as challenges to and anomalies in the studies based on grand
theories of moral development, Jensen (2008) proposes a cultural-developmental
approach. This approach seeks to draw on and synthesise the earlier theories of Kohl-
berg, Piaget, Turiel and Gilligan mentioned above. Jensen emphasises the enormous
variability in type and range of cultural inﬂuences to which different children (and
indeed adults) may be exposed and with which they interact. The perspective has par-
ticular salience for this reﬂective account of how a group of researchers also sought to
expose and examine their own socially and culturally constructed assumptions and the-
ories about character development.
Research design
The early moral thinking of children can be manifested in what they say or what they
do. In order to be more conﬁdent that the evidence gathered related to the way children
actually saw things rather than to assume that the things they said necessarily indicated
more than an ability to recycle words and phrases offered them by adults without any-
thing resembling an adult understanding of the words, the study employed a grounded
theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990).
It is important to note that there have been criticisms of the grounded theory method
(e.g. Bryman 1988; Bryman and Burgess 1994). Aull Davies (1999, 198) writes of a
‘naive assumption that data can initially be interrogated from a theoretically neutral pos-
ition, as well as for not allowing sufﬁcient development of more interpretative forms of
analysis – keeping the emphasis on substantive as opposed to formal theory.’ These are
very real problems; but rather than give in to them, this study attempted tominimise their
effect, in part by being explicitly aware of theories that might steer the contextualisation
of the research and, as far as possible to challenge such theories rather than privileging
them. The development of the study’s sample and methods aimed to encourage
ongoing reﬂexivity among the research team and to ensure that theories were challenged.
Davies’ complaint about lack of formal theory is not seen as a weakness: to arrive at any
such rigid conclusion, however tentatively, is not an appropriate conclusion to a single
study. However, a range of speculative possibilities were raised. After an overview of
the methods (more fully detailed in Arthur, Powell et al. 2009), the following sections
deal with a detailed example of how this was attempted.
Six early childhood education settings were recruited. Each had been judged
through inspection by Ofsted to offer ‘outstanding’ provision in relation to children’s
social and emotional development, which provided a theoretical degree of parity in
terms of the settings’ provision of early childhood education and care. A second cri-
terion for selection was the classiﬁcation as either urban or rural. This distinction
was chosen to allow for subsequent analysis of data on the basis of differing demo-
graphic variables. Three urban settings were chosen from relatively deprived parts of
London and three rural settings from relatively afﬂuent parts of Kent (based on the
English Indices of Multiple Deprivation [DCLG 2007]), with a view to possible analy-
sis in terms of demographic data.
Children were sampled on the basis of their age, the initial requirement being simply
that they were around 36 months at the start of an observation period. Up to two boys
and two girls were then randomly chosen and consent sought from parents. In cases
8 J. Arthur et al.
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where parental consent was denied, the next child (boy or girl) on the list was selected.
Three cohorts of three- to four-year-olds were selected in this way in May 2008 (seven
children), September 2008 (24 children) and September 2009 (24 children). The ﬁrst
two cohorts (31 children) were tracked as they entered their (14) primary schools
during the academic year in which they had their ﬁfth birthday.
Within the six settings, 14 focus children’s key workers and 24 (of the focus chil-
dren’s) parents were invited to take part in the study in stage two (cohort two). The head
teachers or the managers of the settings also participated in interviews, informal discus-
sions and the practitioners’ survey (questionnaire). Other informants in school settings
included 14 reception year teachers, three teaching assistants, and two head-teachers,
with whom informal discussions took place.
Methods, which are described in full in Arthur, Powell et al. (2010), included:
(1) Unstructured observations of children’s everyday interactions and the ethos of
the settings. There were 86 visits, lasting six hours each: 72 to preschool edu-
cation and care settings and 14 to primary school reception classes.
(2) Two discussion groups with the parents and one group with early childhood
education and care (ECEC) professionals in the Kent settings.
(3) Questionnaire to parents/carers (313) and ECEC professionals (50).
(4) Interviews lasting 10 to 20 minutes with six parents in London settings, and 28
ECEC professionals, and reception class teachers in Kent and London settings
(28).
(5) Four discussions based on video-clips (of observations) with ECEC pro-
fessionals and parents in Kent and London settings.
(6) Discussions with children by means of stories, video clips, and children’s own
materials.
(7) Semi-structured interviews with parents and discussions with the children (ﬁve)
at home, once the children had progressed to their primary schools.
In this article, we present reﬂections on the design and methods using examples from
the unstructured observations. The sampling strategy mentioned above was primarily
designed to apply to the survey and interview methods. As such, the variables are men-
tioned in relation to this wider study (reported in Arthur et al. 2010) but were not appli-
cable to the analysis of observation data and so are not elaborated in this article. The
study was guided by an awareness of unnecessary and unhelpful distinctions
between quantitative and qualitative research methods. Throughout, every effort was
made to achieve the strengths of both approaches and to avoid the weakness of each.
Sharing behaviours observed and analysed
A major aim of this study was the identiﬁcation of examples of morality and values
exhibited through their play, narratives and interactions. Naturalistic observation was
seen as useful in at least three ways (Dunn 2005). First, children grow up in social
worlds, a complicated network which they need to adjust themselves to live with. It
is within their social relationships that their characters, the understanding of a set of
values, and the beliefs in certain moral frames are developed. Using naturalistic obser-
vations provides opportunities to gather data that may evidence how children use their
power of understanding others and the value systems they embrace to interact with
different people in a variety of social interactions
European Early Childhood Education Research Journal 9
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Naturalistic observations also occur in a real-life context. The data gathered record
children’s real-life experiences and their reactions to those experiences. Selecting a
positive reaction in response to a cameo situation says very little about what a child
would actually do in a real life encounter.
Finally, naturalistic observations allow researchers to study the situations/events
that are emotionally meaningful to children. The naturalistic approach enables research-
ers to record such information on emotional reaction shown in the real-life context by
children’s talk, behaviours, facial expressions and physical posture. The emotional
dimension can enrich the interpretation.
Limits of this approach also need to be made explicit. The lack of control in natur-
alistic observations, compared with experimental approaches, prevents standardisation
and limits the scope for general conclusions. However, purely statistical generalisation
carries weight only as far as the population from which randomisation took place and
any general conclusion relating to the world at large, especially in the absence of ran-
domisation, must depend on similar considerations to those involved in drawing con-
clusions from naturalistic observation. Fawcett (2009, 56) has cautioned that
naturalistic observation presents the researcher with potentially vast quantities of
unstructured data, which may make comparisons difﬁcult. By contrast, Rolfe (2001,
231) has suggested that observer subjectivity determines behaviours that are noticed
and recorded; effectively, the researcher’s unconscious bias may ‘structure’ the data.
She recommends techniques to promote researcher ‘reliability’ (Rolfe 2001, 233),
although phenomenologists and ethnographers have challenged such positions,
suggesting layered interpretations of ‘real world’ experiences and embracing this
‘double hermeneutic’ (Smith and Osborn 2008, 53).
One topic that led to very complex discussion among the research team was sharing,
an idea that many teachers were seen to emphasise and encourage. In one setting the
children followed and talked about fairly complex rules on taking turns. Initial obser-
vations also showed that many incidents that might be seen as involving moral thinking
did involve sharing or failing to share. It would be tempting to jump to the conclusion
that children adopted the idea of sharing, either as a form of compliance with the tea-
cher’s authority or as a consequence of empathy, and that this notion would go on to
blossom gradually into a notion of distributive justice at a later stage. Alternative
hypotheses were considered. Did children actually mean by ‘sharing’ something
other than what the teachers had in mind? Were they consciously sharing or were
they going about their lives and incidentally doing things happened to be sharing?
Were they simply doing what was necessary to play with their friends? Were they
perhaps using sharing as a weapon, sharing with an ‘in group’ as a way of excluding
others? After much discussion it was agreed that it would be very difﬁcult to ﬁnd evi-
dence that counted either way in answering any of these questions.
It was essential to pursue a measure of reliability in the observations upon which
discussions were to be based. It is all too easy for naturalistic observation to record aty-
pical actions which are in fact misleading as a guide to the way children in general
behave or think. The variability in children’s behaviour and the enormous level of
randomness inevitably involved in observing only some behaviour of some children
in some sessions, demanded attempts to minimise any unnecessary sources of
variability.
After initial observation of the children by the main ﬁeld researcher and preliminary
discussions, the ﬁeld notes were coded by the ﬁeld researcher and independently by
another member of the research team. In addition to this, a senior researcher
10 J. Arthur et al.
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experienced (and thus perhaps prejudiced) in the ﬁeld of early childhood was recruited
from outside the team and unaware of the content of discussion thus far. When a level of
agreement was reached, the second team member acted as a second observer in some
sessions, not shadowing the main ﬁeld researcher but exploring whether the two sets of
notes on the two sets of interactions witnessed by the two independent observers bore
enough similarity to suggest that what was being recorded was something of general
relevance to the setting and thus capable of at least suggesting general interpretation.
Possibly because sharing behaviours are easier to notice than some other forms of
ostensibly moral behaviour, sharing emerged from this process as a major focus of
interest. Young children’s sharing behaviours documented in some reports (Rheingold,
Hay, and West 1976; Hay et al. 1991) suggest that children’s early sharing may occur
shortly before their ﬁrst birthday. Rheingold et al. (1976) claimed that infants begin the
process of sharing by offering food and other objects to their companions, e.g. mothers,
fathers, siblings, peers and other adults. The sharing behaviours of these infants, which
the authors called ‘partner play,’ also involved showing objects to other persons at a
distance, and engaging in coordinated use of them.
Some studies have focused on the frequency of sharing behaviours (Rheingold et al.
1976; Hay et al. 1991; Rao and Stewart 1999), and the people with whom young chil-
dren share, e.g. friends or acquaintances (Birch and Billman 1986). Others have
explored children’s understanding of sharing, the relationships between sharing and
variables, e.g. young children’s capacity in moral reasoning, and empathy, the
reasons that young children share, e.g. need for approval or reciprocity (Staub and
Sherk 1970), and the resources for learning to share, e.g. parenting styles (Radke-
Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, and Chapman 1983) and preschool education (using incentive
social reinforcement, Doland and Adelberg 1967). However, there is a paucity of
studies exploring the content (how children actually do) of young children’s sharing
behaviours. The main reason for this can be the use of methodology in studies of
sharing behaviour. The majority of studies were experimental designs. Even though
the data were collected in the school or home environment, a hypothetical scenario
or a preset testing design was in place. In this study, employing naturalistic obser-
vations in the early childhood education settings provided a possibility not only to
explore the possible contribution of environment to children’s behaviours (in familiar
contexts), but also while they were engaged in both adult-led and child-led activities.
A number of sharing behaviours occurred in subtle, non-verbal ways; in terms of
language it was noticeable that in potential sharing situations the opening move was
often that made by the child who stood to gain from the sharing. ‘Can I have it?’
was a common opener. Prompted by this and other observations, a sceptical line of
thought was pursued. Sharing behaviours and potential sharing situations were
looked at in terms of the following questions.
. Was each child sharing only or largely to comply with the wishes of a teacher or a
stronger child?
. Was each child concerned with what (s)he could gain from the transaction or with
what others could gain?
. Was each child using sharing as a way to strengthen (power) relations with other
children?
. Was each child using sharing to emphasise the exclusion of children not allowed
to share?
European Early Childhood Education Research Journal 11
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A provisional list of types of sharing behaviour was also compiled. For children who
stood to gain:
. Distribution;
. Taking turns;
. Asking;
. Demanding;
. Demanding with force.
For children giving up something:
. Distribution (with justice);
. Enjoying together;
. Taking turns;
. Giving away.
Examples from the observations as they were recorded by the researchers are provided
below. These serve to illustrate some of the behaviours that were coded broadly as
sharing. After these examples, there follows an explanation of how the team
approached the analysis of this complex data.
Straightforward compliance with adults’ wishes was sometimes easy to spot. In one
observation it was ﬁrst.
A teacher was supervising children playing with paper balls together in the playground.
Children all wanted to try to throw the ball. A child came and was desperate to have a
go. Teacher: ‘After A, B, and C you can have a go.’ The children took turns.
The absence of adult intervention might lead to a breakdown in sharing.
Four girls were cooking. They kneaded the dough and then started using a cup to
make scone shapes.
D said to E: ‘I give it to her and then she gives it to me.’
At the same time, E was looking towards the teacher while she was talking.
The teacher did not notice/hear her, or just did not respond.
F gave the cup to G: ‘After you, I have a go.’
G was using it. From her posture F seemed to want it back for making the shape.
F: ‘Please.’
G: ‘No.’
F was waiting.
The teacher took it to the other child.
F was still waiting.
Z was using the model.
F was still waiting.
F got the teacher.
Teacher: ‘G, can you let F use the model?’
G gave it to F.
E to F: ‘Can I have that?’
F passed it over.
In one setting children were found to insist on the compliance of others when spon-
taneous sharing did not meet their needs. One boy who clearly did not like the idea
12 J. Arthur et al.
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of letting others share was keen to use the authority of nursery routine (of using an elec-
tronic egg timer to help the children take turns) when sharing was in his interest.
The same thing appeared to repeat every day.
H got the bike he wanted. He rode for a while. Then he asked his friend I to look after it.
Another child J came over and took the bike.
H was not happy and cried when he came back and found out his bike was taken. He com-
plained to the teacher.
Teacher: ‘H, you had a turn already and now let J have a go.’
H was not happy. Immediately he went to pick up the timer and showed it to J.
On occasion the idea of compliance seemed to be absent. Sharing appeared to come
from spontaneous good will.
K was preparing the snack. He was going to cut the apple. ‘Everyone wants to have snack.
They can all have snack’ he said while he was doing it.
The apple was quite hard and he could not manage it.
He asked for some help from the adult.
Then he ﬁnished cutting it. He put the apple on the plate.
Two girls came over and sat down to have snack.
After them K had his snack.
Sharing was sometimes a means to consolidate friendship:
L carried on her water song and washing the paint area.
M tidied up her work and watched L.
M stood there for a while and looked at L.
L: ‘You want to try it?’
M: ‘Yes.’
L: ‘You can help me if you like.’
M: ‘I want to do it.’
M looked rather impatient and slightly annoyed.
L: ‘What’s your dad’s name? Does he have a name?’ … ‘Have you got brother and sister?’
M: ‘NO.’
L: ‘Wait for me ﬁnish?’ L kissed M.
M did not seem to feel interested in the conversation.
L still took time to tidy up everything.
L ﬁnished and M started to do her painting.
The sharing sometimes broke down:
N (male) and O (female) were very busy collecting various things: toys, road sign, books,
chairs, etc. They were building a house.
N turned to Researcher: ‘We are going to play the game in a minute. Oh no, we are playing
the game.’
N got more board from other places.
After a while, some other children came over and rushed into the house.
P (female): ‘I am home.’
O: ‘This is ours.’
P: ‘I can get through this.’
N: ‘No, that’s ours.’
O: ‘That’s our house. You can’t have it. It’s our house.’
P: ‘It’s everybody’s house.’
O announced: ‘We got to change.’
N ‘We are going to move house because the children are upset. They are stealing.’
N and O moved some stuff to a ‘caravan’ and both played inside.
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Q (female) came and wanted to play in the tree house the boys were playing.
R (male) slightly pulled her shoes and wanted her to get down: ‘That’s our ship.’
Adult: ‘Can you let Q.’
R: ‘That’s our ship.’
Adult: ‘Why not?’
R: ‘That’s our ship.’
Later on R threw the train out.
S (female) ‘R, I think T’s got hurt.’
R: ‘That’s our ship. Get off.’
T: ‘It’s our ship. I’m coming to get you. Get off.’
Those asking to share were sometimes in control. In the following incident the nursery turn-
taking routine acted as a restraint on the boy demanding rather than the boy in possession
of resources.
Children were riding bikes in the garden.
U, demanding the bike, argued with V who was riding it.
V began to cry and toppled over.
U left.
V went to fetch the timer and approached W (male) who was riding another bike, demand-
ing again.
V: ‘W, I want your bike!’
V showed W the timer and waved it up and down in his face.
Discussion
Sharing behaviour is problematic largely because of the difﬁculty of devising a notion
of sharing that is sufﬁciently precise to satisfy adults and sufﬁciently vague to capture
what is going on when children seem to share. There are two fundamentally different
types of sharing context. In the ﬁrst someone in authority (or otherwise in control) dis-
tributes resources to all those who wish to have them. In adult situations questions of
distributive justice and fairness arise at this point. Children can also be very alert to dis-
tributive injustice to their own disadvantage.
The second type of sharing context is more relevant to the present study. In this one
person has resources that (s)he wishes to use but allows others who also wish to use
them to have some. It has to be possible for the ﬁrst person to use the resources
given to the second and thus to suffer some loss when they are handed over. It may
be that the second person can claim a right to some of the resources, in which case
there is a (tacit) appeal to some authority and the context is really of the ﬁrst type.
Where this is not the case generosity, empathy and compassion are of more relevance
than distributive justice.
Much of the sharing behaviour observed in one preschool setting was either
prompted by an adult or forced upon the sharer by the beneﬁciary using a timer that
the nursery employed to regulate turn taking with popular equipment. In both these
cases it is possible that the sharer was doing no more than complying with adult instruc-
tion of one kind or another. Also, much of the behaviour recorded seemed more like a
power struggle for resources than benevolence.
We cannot expect children’s thinking, talk and behaviour to ﬁt neatly into a
pattern required to be a precursor of adult virtues. Perhaps the most promising
piece of behaviour, in terms of preparation for adulthood, is the example reported
by Lin (2010, 56).
X (male) had been using scissors for ﬁve minutes.
Y (female) approached and wanted to use the scissors.
14 J. Arthur et al.
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Y: ‘Can I have some scissors, please.’
X: ‘There are some inside.’
Y messes up the work table.
X: ‘Look what you have done.’
X carried on cutting his work.
Y: ‘Can you cut this for me?’
X: ‘There are some like this inside’
Y ignored what X said.
After a while X went in to the classroom and brought some scissors for Y.
Y used them for a few seconds and left.
The example is intended to illustrate difﬁculties that are always present even in the sim-
plest piece of research, but which become salient when more complicated designs, par-
ticularly those drawing on both qualitative and quantitative perspectives, are employed.
The naturalistic approach to observing the children and the iterative and collaborative
analysis of the evidence had advantages and disadvantages as described earlier.
Although the researchers were tentative in claims about the children’s moral awareness
and development, the approach enabled the creation of a theoretical model for sharing
on which future research may be developed and for which various research designs are
possible.
The ﬁndings from the naturalistic observations were considered in parallel to those
from questionnaires and discussion groups or interviews with parents and early years
practitioners. Referring back to comments made in the group or individual interviews,
as reported in Arthur, Powell, et al. (2010), some parents construed speciﬁc behaviours
in complex ways that would be difﬁcult to reduce to a simple response on a Likert scale
in a questionnaire.
‘The ‘naughty’ spells are usually to do with tiredness or…’‘Naughty or just learning
boundaries?’
Consequently, the questions in the questionnaires and the analysis of responses to these
were treated with caution and the use of principal component analysis. Without the
observations of the children’s complex sharing behaviours that so challenged the
research team, it might have been difﬁcult to resist drawing simplistic conclusions
from the questionnaire data. Clearly that would have been wrong, though Seale
(1999) suggests that this is the way in which qualitative analysis often works. A quan-
titative approach would have suggested that no such conclusion should even be hinted
at without further corroboration. Seale (1999) suggests that the absence of such con-
siderations in much qualitative research can also lead to poor quality work.
Conclusion
The use of naturalistic observation (repeated and longitudinal) can produce a wealth of
rich data that is possible to analyse in a variety of ways, including the way this article
approached the analysis. The method employed, after initial visits when everyone
becomes familiar with the researcher, is largely non intrusive because the researcher
effectively becomes part of the environment. The main danger, as already highlighted
in the article, is of researcher bias during data collection. Do we only notice some
things and not others because of our beliefs, values, and prior experiences? What do
we miss? Use of video observation was used as a check and the research employed
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more than one researcher to go in and the team as a whole explored the observation
records in order to critique/share the analysis. Using observations and discussion
groups/interviews at the beginning of the research emphasised the need for caution in
developing the questions and response categories for the questionnaire. This article
focuses on the collection, analysis and interpretation of data gathered through naturalistic
observations of sharing behaviours and conﬁrms the need for a cautious approach to any
explanations of motives underlying the children’s behaviours or associations with their
moral development.
The overall conclusions about sharing are that the children’s complex and varying
approaches to what we identiﬁed as sharing behaviours are framed by adult beliefs,
values and assumptions in terms of our/practitioners’ assumptions about what
sharing is and should be. These assumptions are themselves culturally constructed
on a macro scale, but also on a micro scale; the cultures of early years settings, e.g.
where the timer dictated behaviours and this being accepted as ‘right.’ It could even
be said that it had become ‘best practice’ in terms of the staff’s assumptions about
how the children should behave with one another when the resources were to be distrib-
uted. It might therefore be wise to think about moral development in relation to more
than one of the ‘grand theories’ instead of one or other of them. This would connect
with ideas that aspects of young children’s development should not be seen in isolation,
but that that these are interconnected.
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